Gode and Sunder 1993 described continuous double-auction cda markets populated by zerointelligence" zi traders that act randomly. Their results appear to indicate that no intelligence is required to give h uman-like trading performance. Cli and Bruten 1997 demonstrated serious failings of zi traders. Here,`zi-plus' zip traders are introduced: simple stochastic agents that adapt over time using an elementary form of machine learning. It is shown that the performance of zip traders is signi cantly closer to the human data than is that of zi traders. Thus, human-like trading behavior can be achieved with intelligence that is more than zero but much less than human.
INTRODUCTION
reported results from market experiments where zero-intelligence" zi programs that submit random bids and o ers replace human traders in experimental continuous double-auction cda markets. Gode and Sunder G&S herein demonstrated that the transactionprice time-series of zi-constrained" zi-c traders were human-like insofar as they appeared to converge on the theoretical equilibrium price and yielded levels of allocative e ciency similar to those of comparable human markets. G&S concluded that allocative e ciency was a poor indicator of the intelligence of agents in a cda market, and noted that zi-c traders could be distinguished from humans in cda markets because the zi-c traders gave higher levels of pro t dispersion.
Cli and Bruten 1997 analyzed the probability functions underlying zi-c traders' interactions, in a variety o f cda markets, and predicted market conditions in which zi-c traders would fail to trade at equilibrium prices. Empirical results from experiments demonstrated zi-c traders failing as predicted. Thus, Cli and Bruten 1997 claim that the zi-c traders lack su cient i n telligence or rationality to exhibit human-like equilibration in cda markets. On face value, G&S's zi traders could be assumed to represent a l o w er limit on the intelligence requirements of traders in cda markets, but Cli & Bruten's results indicate that such an assumption would be unfounded. This paper introduces simple adaptive trading agents for cda markets, referred to as zerointelligence-plus" zip traders, that employ an elementary form of`learning' to adapt their trading behavior on the basis of past experience of the market. It is shown that the zip traders avoid the failures of the zi-c traders, and give h uman-like market behavior despite having intelligence that is much less than human.
ZERO INTELLIGENCE TRADERS 2.1 Background
Smith 1962 demonstrated that the transaction prices of remarkably small groups of human traders, operating in experimental cda markets, rapidly approach the theoretical equilibrium price. But the question of just how m uch i n telligence is required of an agent t o a c hieve h uman-level trading performance is an intriguing one. This question was addressed by G&S 1993, whose results appear to indicate that no intelligence at all is required of the traders, so long as they are prevented from trading at a loss.
G&S used zi-c trader-programs in cda markets. They found that the imposition of a budget constraint that prevents zi-c traders from entering into loss-making deals, is su cient t o raise the allocative e ciency of the auctions to values near 100. They conclude that the traders' motivation, intelligence, or learning have little effect on the allocative e ciency, which derives instead largely from the structure of the cda markets. Thus, they claim, Adam Smith's invisible hand may be more powerful than some may h a v e thought; it can generate aggregate rationality not only from individual rationality but also from individual irrationality. " 1993, p.119. This important w ork has been in uential in the experimental economics literature: Cli and Bruten 1997 supply a list of 12 example publications that approvingly cite G&S's result.
G&S used an electronic cda market, where traders were connected on a computer network. G&S's experiments with human traders were performed in a manner similar to that established by Smith 1962: the subjects were divided into a group of sellers and a group of buyers. Sellers were give n a n umber of units of an arbitrary commodity, and each unit had a limit price below which it could not be sold, which w as private i.e., known only to the seller of that unit. Buyers were given the rights and means to buy a number of units, and for each unit they were given a private limit price, above which they could not pay. The array of sellers' limit prices determined the market supply curve, and the array of buyers' limit prices determines the market demand curve. In the experiments with human traders, traders quote' bid and o er prices by t yping them into their computer terminals: the quotes were then distributed to the other traders, and at any time a buyer could accept a seller's o er or a seller could accept a buyer's bid. This continuous trading process was broken into discrete periods or days': at the start of each d a y , new allocations of selling or buying rights were distributed to the traders. In experimental cda markets such a s these, as with real human cda markets, transaction prices rapidly approached the theoretical equilibrium value given by the intersection of the supply and demand curves.
G&S replaced the humans with zi-c traders, simple programs or software agents". G&S used zi-c traders in markets with supply and demand curves similar or identical to those used with their human subjects. Each zi-c trader generates random bid or o er prices, but using a distribution constrained by the limit price for the current unit: each buyer is constrained to bid a price chosen randomly in the range 1; b where b is that buyer's limit price; each seller is constrained to o er at a price chosen randomly from the range s ; 200 where s is that seller's limit price.
G&S presented results from ve t ypes of market. For each t ype of market, they showed timeseries of transaction prices from one experiment with zi-c traders, and from one experiment with human traders. The surprising and signi cant observation that G&S make is that the results from zi-c traders appear to be very similar to those of human traders. In particular, G&S monitored allocative e ciency pro t extracted from the market as a proportion of maximum possible pro t in that market and found that the allocative efciency of humans and zi-c traders were not signi cantly di erent. Thus, they conclude that no intelligence other than the budget constraint is required of trading agents to exhibit human-like b ehavior in cda markets. G&S speculate that no intelligence is necessary for the transaction prices of the traders to converge to the equilibrium value, and they close their paper with brief discussion of measurements of pro t dispersion, D, de ned for a group of n traders as D = 1 n P n i =1 a i ,e i 2 0:5 .
where a i is the actual pro t earned by trader i, and e i is the pro t that trader would realize if all units were traded at the equilibrium price. Values of D for zi-c traders are signi cantly higher than those for human cda markets.
Critique
Cli and Bruten 1997 presented a critique of G&S's 1993 work, motivated by considering zi-c trading behavior in four types of market, three of which di er from those used by G&S. Fig. 1 shows the supply and demand curves for the four types of market, labeled A, B, C, and D, with equilibrium price P 0 and quantity Q 0 as indicated.
In market A, the supply and demand curves are symmetric, in that they have gradients that are approximately equal in magnitude but opposite in sign. In Market B, the supply curve is at over the range of quantities supplied. In Markets C and D, both the supply curve and the demand curve are at. However, in C, demand exceeds supply, and so the equilibrium price P 0 is set by the point where the supply curve cuts up through the demand curve, because the excess demand encourages price competition among buyers that will lead to bid-price increases until the maximum buyer limit price is reached. Similarly, i n D , supply exceeds demand and so the excess supply encourages o er-price cuts, driving the price down to equilibrium at the point where the demand curve cuts down through the supply curve.
In the ve experiments presented by G&S, the market supply and demand were all similar to A, although not so perfectly symmetric over the range of quantities 0 to Q 0 . Y et markets such a s as B, C, and D have also been studied in the literature. For example, market B is similar to Smith's 1962 Chart 4", and markets C and D are similar to Smith's 1962 Chart 6". Markets C and D are also known as box-design" schedules Davis & Holt, 1993, p.141. For each of the four styles of market shown in Fig. 1 , Cli and Bruten 1997 developed analytic predictions of how the zi-c traders would perform: in markets B, C, and D, failure of the average zi-c transaction prices to reach equilibrium was predicted from analysis and con rmed empirically.
ZI-PLUS TRADERS
It is demonstrated here that remarkably simple adaptive mechanisms can give performance that does not su er from the problems a ecting G&S's zi-c traders: only a slight increase in`intelligence' is necessary. Thus, these trading agents are referred to as zero-intelligence-plus" zip traders.
A pro t-motivated trader in an experimental cda market will not quote an initial o er-price or bid-price for a unit that is equal to that unit's limit-price : t o d o s o w ould be to trade at zero pro t. If p denotes the price a trader quotes for a transaction, then sellers should quote p and buyers should quote p . The relative di erence between p and will be referred to as the trader's pro t margin. The zip traders adjust their pro t margins up or down, on the basis of the prices of bids and o ers made by the other traders, and whether those quotes are accepted leading to transactions, or ignored.
The intention here is only to demonstrate that the simple adaptive mechanisms in zip traders can give results better than zi-c traders and more similar to those of human traders. The complete rationale for the current design of zip trader agents, and extensive sets of results, are given in Cli 1997, which includes all the C sourcecode for the system programs. A recent thesis by v an Montfort 1997 explores the use of these zip traders in spatially distributed markets where there may b e h undreds or thousands of agents.
The problem of designing a trading agent can be considered as a combination of two issues: the qualitative issue of deciding when to increase or decrease the pro t margin discussed in Section 3.1, and the quantitative issue of deciding by how much the margin should be altered discussed in Section 3.2. Having explained these details, Section 3.3 then presents results from experiments with zip traders operating in the markets used to illustrate the failure of zi-c traders.
Qualitative Considerations
To eliminate the need for sophisticated memory mechanisms, each zip trader alters its pro t margin on the basis of four factors. The rst factor is whether the agent i s active in the market: agents are active if they are still capable of making a transaction in the market, and are inactive i f they have sold or bought their full entitlement o f units of the commodity. The remaining three factors concern q, the last price quoted by a n y agent in the market: referred to as the last quote. Each zip trader takes note of whether the last quote was an o er or a bid, whether it was accepted i.e., led to a transaction or rejected ignored by the traders in the market, and whether it is greater than or less than the price that zip trader would currently quote. The price a zip trader i would currently quote is trader i's quote-price, p i , which is calculated from trader i's values of i;j i's limit price for unit j and i i's pro t margin using p i = i;j 1 + i .
A zip seller raises its pro t margin whenever the last quote was accepted and p i q. I t l o w ers its margin only if it is still active and the last quote was an o er with p i q, or if the last quote was a bid that was accepted and p i q. Similarly, a zip buyer raises its pro t margin whenever the last quote was accepted and p i q, and it lowers its margin when it is active and either the last quote was a rejected bid with p i q or the last quote was an accepted o er with p i q. The adaptation mechanism that alters the pro t margin is described next.
Adaptation
At a given time-step t, a zip trader i calculates its quote-price p i t for its unit j with limit price i;j using the current v alue of its pro t margin i t, The core of this adaptation method is Equation 1, the Widrow-Ho delta rule" which also underlies learning in back-propagation arti cial neural networks Rumelhart, Hinton, & Williams, 1986 and classi er systems Wilson, 1994 . This rule gives asymptotic convergence of p i t to a target price i t at a speed determined by i 2 0; 1 .
The target price i t is calculated by m ultiplying qt b y a r elative coe cient R i t and then adding a small absolute perturbation A i t. The values for R i t and A i t are stochastically generated from independent and identical distributions for each trader, every time i t is calculated. When the intention is to increase the The Widrow-Ho rule forces p i t to approach i t, but i t is itself dynamically varying. The system may be`damped' by setting i 2 0; 1 to non-zero values, limiting high-frequency oscillations. This method is also used in back-propagation neural networks Rumelhart et al., 1986. Data from markets of zip traders with this pro t-margin adaptation are shown below.
Results
To allow direct comparison, results are presented here from zip traders operating in the four markets that Cli and Bruten 1997 used to show the failure of zi-c traders: the supply and demand curves for these markets are as illustrated in Fig.1 . In all markets, the equilibrium values Results showing the average of 50 runs, each for 10`days', for zi-c and zip traders in markets A and B are shown in Table 1 , and for markets C and D in Table 2 . As predicted by Cli and Bruten 1997, the zi-c traders reach equilibrium in market A but fail in markets B, C, and D. H o w ever, the average transaction prices of the zip traders in all four markets tend toward the equilibrium price P 0 = 200. In markets A and B the average zip transaction price rapidly converges to near 200, typically within the rst four trading days, and remains at that level thereafter, with low v ariance.
The data presented in Table 2 are less satisfactory: the initial average zip transaction prices are close to those of the zi-c traders, but this is followed by a comparatively slow y et steady approach t o w ard P 0 , from below. To further illustrate the behavior of zip traders in these two mar- kets, the experiments were continued to 30 trading days. As is clear from the d = 30 data, the longterm tendency of the zip traders is towards P 0 . If the various system parameters such as the initial distributions of pro t margins, and the distributions of learning rates and momentum values were altered, faster approach t o P 0 in markets C and D could be demonstrated. Similarly, the approach to equilibrium from below in market A is an artefact of the buyers and sellers having initial values of pro t margin drawn from distributions over the same ranges of percentages, as explained by Cli 1997. Again, the initial settings of the traders' parameters could be altered to eliminate this bias i.e., give the sellers higher percentage pro t margins than the buyers.
However, the intention here is not to demonstrate zip traders with optimal parameter settings: rather, the data presented here serves to demonstrate that the simple zip trading strategies can readily achieve results that Cli and Bruten 1997 demonstrated to be impossible when using zi-c traders, and are closer to those expected from human subjects or traditional rational-expectations theoretical predictions, with the same zip parameter values in a variety of market conditions. On these grounds at least, the minimally adaptive zip traders represent a signi cant advance on the work of G&S.
Smith's measure of allocative e ciency and G&S's measure of pro t dispersion were also calculated for the zip traders. As with the zi-c traders, measures of allocative e ciency for zip traders are typically very high often averaging 100. For this reason, zip allocative e ciency data are not very informative, and so are not shown here. However, the pro t dispersion data are more revealing: time series of average pro t dispersion values for both zi-c and zip traders in the markets A to D are shown in Tables 3 and 4. The pro t dispersion data clearly shows that in all cases the nal pro t dispersion is signicantly less for zip traders than for zi-c traders. In markets A and B the zip pro t dispersion falls sharply over the rst four days and then levels out to a roughly constant v alue; in markets C and D the fall is less dramatic but could be made more rapid by appropriate alteration of the parametersettings, as discussed previously. In Section 2.1, it was noted that G&S state that the zi-c pro t dispersion levels are appreciably higher than those of human traders. Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate zip traders rapidly adapting to give pro t dispersion levels that are in some cases more than a factor of ten less than those of zi-c traders. On this basis, it seems safe to claim that the performance of the zip traders shown here is signi cantly closer to that of human traders than is the performance of zi-c traders.
Related Work
Despite G&S's work on zi traders having been cited approvingly in a number of texts discussing cda markets, there appear to be very few papers that are comparable to the work described here: we know of no other critiques of G&S's work, and have found only two papers that describe articial trading agents similar to the zip traders developed here. These two papers are by Easley and Ledyard 1992 and Rust, Miller, and Palmer 1992 , discussed below. Cli 1997 provides an extended critique of the market-based control literature e.g. Clearwater 1996 , noting that the problem of incorporating bargaining mechanisms in software agents is commonly a v oided by i n troducing centralized auctioneer processes. For this reason, no work in market-based control is reviewed here. Cli 1997 also discusses the lack of relevant w ork in arti cial life" research.
Easley and Ledyard 1992 developed an analysis of hypotheses for price formation and equilibration in human markets, describing a strategy that yielded three speci c predictions of human market behavior. Their trading strategy is simple, but requires more market data than do zip traders and can only enter into one transaction per day zip traders can engage in multiple transactions: see Cli 1997. Easley and Ledyard's E&L's herein strategy is only fully e ective after the rst day of trading; yet it is often on the rst day that the most signi cant shifts in behavior occur. Also, E&L's analysis relies on a simplifying assumption that is questionable in practice: they assume that, when more than one trader is interested in a transaction, the trader o ering the best price is guaranteed success 1992, p.70. Several of the experimental observations E&L present contradict their theoretical predictions. Furthermore, as E&L 1992, p.87 note, their theory does not apply to experiments in which one side of the market is`silent' e.g., retail markets, and it doesn't predict the e ects of shifts in supply and demand curves. However, swift and stable equilibration responses of zip traders when supply and demand alter, and the human-like equilibration of zip traders in`retail' markets, are both demonstrated by Cli 1997. Because zip traders give good performance in situations where E&L's work cannot be applied, it seems fair to claim that zip traders are both simpler than, and an advance on, the work of E&L 1992. Rust et al. 1992 report on a series of experimental economics tournaments they organized, where other researchers were invited to submit software agents that would compete against one another in a simpli ed cda market. Hence, their markets were composed of traders with heterogeneous strategies, and the most successful strategy was essentially parasitic: it exploited the actions of other strategies; but a homogeneous cda market populated entirely by the parasite strategy exhibited manifestly suboptimal dynamics. Thus, there is no focus in Rust et al. 1992 on explicit critiques of G&S's zi traders, or on exploring the behavior of homogeneous groups of traders in differing environments such as markets A to D.
The recent w ork of Epstein and Axtell 1996 has attracted much attention. This includes studies of bilateral trade between simple software agents in spatially distributed markets, but the trade mechanisms involve the exchange or bartering of two commodities: there is no money or price mechanism in their models Epstein & Axtell, 1996, p.101 , and so their work also does not bear comparison with G&S's.
Summary
The results presented in Section 3.3 demonstrated that the zip traders yield better results than zi-c traders: Tables 1 and 2 showed zi-c traders converging to equilibrium in one market but failing as predicted by Cli and Bruten 1997 in another three. In contrast, the zip traders succeed in reaching equilibrium in all four markets. It was also demonstrated that pro t dispersion is lower in zip trader markets than in zi-c markets, so the zip results are closer to the human-trader data presented by Gode and Sunder 1993. In addition to comparing the behavior of zip and zi-c traders, we can also compare the behavior of zip traders to Smith's 1962 results from human subjects. In particular, Smith notes that in his excess-demand market, : : : The approach t o equilibrium is from below, and the convergence is relatively slow": both of these qualities are exhibited in market C by the zip trader results, but not the zi-c trader results, in Smith 1962 also experimented with altering supply and demand mid-way through the experiment, and with`high-volume' markets where his human subjects were given the right to buy or sell more than one unit per day. Again, zip traders exhibit human-like performance in such markets, rapidly adapting to the new P 0 Cli , 1997. The similarities between theoretical predictions, human data, and zip traders are striking and signi cant because of the simplicity of the trading strategies and adaptation mechanisms in the zip traders. While Cli and Bruten 1997 demonstrated that G&S's zi-c traders are too simple, the results in this paper indicate that the zip traders introduced here are simple enough to give h umanlike performance, but not too simple.
CONCLUSION
Computational trading agents can be viewed as mechanistically rigorous statements of potential models of human bargaining behaviors. G&S's work was an important contribution to the eld of experimental economics, proposing an absolute lower limit on the mechanistic complexity o f cda trading agents, and demonstrating that allocative e ciency is a poor indicator of the intelligence of agents in a cda market. However, Cli & Bruten's 1997 critique predicts failings of zi-c traders that were con rmed empirically. Thereby indicating a need for bargaining mechanisms more complex than simple constrained stochastic generation of prices.
The work on zip traders reported here should be viewed as a preliminary sketch of what forms such bargaining mechanisms might take. The zip traders are more complex than G&S's zi-c traders, but only slightly, and in any case are manifestly much less complex than humans. Nevertheless, the results from the zip traders, both in terms of equilibration and pro t dispersion, are clearly closer to those from human experimental markets than are the results from zi-c traders. It is reassuring to see that very simple mechanisms can give such h uman-like results, but there is much further work that could be done in exploring behavior of zip traders in more complex market environments, and in attempting to extend the behavioral sophistication of such traders without unduly adding to their complexity.
